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ROLL OVER, LLEWELLYN? 
Peter A. A lees* 
I wrote some years ago that "[n]ot since Llewellyn's death ... has 
the efficacy of drafting commercial law from the legal realists' frame of 
reference been examined." 1 With the current proliferation of projects to 
adjust, amend, rewrite and draft new, whole articles of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential perspective has been 
challenged. 
Most importantly, Llewellyn knew what a statute could not do, and 
he knew what a judge could and could not do with a statute. Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code is a jurisprudential statement; it's Llewel-
lyn's assertion that commercial sales law could be liberated from "the 
Law" by focusing on the natural forces inhibiting uncommercial behav-
ior and providing a "Cardozoean" means to discern the immanent justice 
in recurring trouble cases.2 Llewellyn's legal realism3 does not just vindi-
cate the status quo, but accommodates development along consistent 
lines that would not cross when the interests of powerful lobbies were 
brought to bear. 
Llewellyn chose sales law as his laboratory, an area of the commer-
cial law composed of a body of commercial principles and invigorated by 
transactors responsive to a commonality of interests. Codifying sales law 
would be easier than codifying many other areas of the commercial law if 
your design were to develop a framework that would enable the courts to 
reach not just predictable results, but the better or even the best results. 
So Llewellyn did, to an extent, start with a deck stacked in his favor. 
The community of commercial sales transactors is substantially ho-
mogeneous. Buyers and sellers of goods share a common interest, realiz-
ing the mutual benefits of exchange, and, in more sophisticated 
transactions, those more likely to litigate will be represented by sophisti-
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. 
1. Peter A. Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer Relations, 32 WAYNE L. 
REv. 1279, 1298 (1986). 
2. Justice Cardozo's regard for fluid legal concepts, capable of adaptation to ongoing 
situations, impressed Llewellyn, who envisioned the Code as the source of law for commercial 
transactions now and in the future. 
3. Llewellyn believed there was no unitary school of legal realism. Each realist sub-
scribed to a legal philosophy that was not necessarily the same as that espoused by other 
realists. What distinguished the movement and provided the common ground among its ad-
herents more than anything else was an impatience with formalism. 
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cated counsel. Now that would not distinguish sales from secured trans-
actions. Article 9 deals are regularly negotiated by counsel, and both the 
creditor and debtor believe that the transaction will be mutually advanta-
geous. Secured transactions, however, are distinguishable from sales 
transactions insofar as they are typically dominated by the secured party. 
The lender in one deal is generally the lender in the next. On the other 
hand, the seller in one Article 2 transaction is often the buyer in the next. 
Sears both buys and sells. Citicorp makes Article 9 loans; it does not (in 
its normal course) borrow money on Article 9 terms. 
This distinction between Articles 2 and 9 explains why Article 2 
achieves a better balance between the rights of buyers and sellers than 
Article 9 achieves between creditors and debtors. It also explains why 
there might be more litigation concerning Article 2 than there would 
Article 9. Buyers and sellers of relatively equal financial power would 
bring an Article 2 action, whereas most Article 9 debtors would not have 
the same wherewithal to sue an Article 9 creditor. 4 
Further, the fact that buyers and sellers are interchangeable from 
one deal to the next suggests that at the time Article 2 was drafted or 
revised, it would be easier to reach agreement on the formulation of a 
provision that favored neither buyer nor seller over the other. For exam-
ple, Sears as buyer would not want to push too hard for fear of prejudic-
ing the interests of Sears as seller. 
The payments system law-governed by Articles 3 and 4-is dis-
tinct from both sales and secured transactions law because many com-
mercial paper and bank collections transactions involve consumers, on 
whom the predictable business pressures do not necessarily operate in the 
way that and the extent to which they do in sales transactions. You 
could also be fairly certain that even if you were to defer to financial 
institution pressure and draft a rule that favored such interests at the 
expense of consumers, the provision would not generate an avalanche of 
litigation because consumers neither have the means nor the sophistica-
tion to bring actions premised on the loss of far less than a few hundred 
dollars.5 
So Llewellyn reserved for himself the article of the UCC that pro-
vided the best setting for his, Cardozo's and Corbin's jurisprudential 
perspective. 
Then Llewellyn set about drafting an article that would work in the 
way that he thought the statutory law should work. It has been ob-
4. Perhaps the proliferation of lender liability theories in the 1980s signaled borrowers' 
willingness to more aggressively confront their lenders in court. 
5. See Alces, supra note 1. 
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served, derisively in commercial circles, that Article 9 provides the an-
swer and that Article 2 merely restates the question. Therefore, Article 9 
is superior to Article 2. It may be, however, that the genius of Article 2 
is its restatement of the question in terms that invite the judge and jury to 
discern the justice that inheres in the recurring contexts. Mr. Donald 
Rapson, a member of the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, formu-
lated for me the difference between the Article 2 and Article 9 drafting 
approaches in a 1986 letter: 
There is clearly an intended and recognized difference be-
tween 2 and 9. Coogan and Kripke purposefully did not adopt 
Llewellyn's drafting technique. It is almost axiomatic that the 
best thing a commercial lawyer can do for his client is to keep 
the client out of court. Article 9 takes that tack. Compared to 
Article 2 which looks to the courts and other forums to decide 
disputes by applying Article 2 principles, Article 9 endeavors to 
prevent the disputes by anticipating the issues and furnishing 
answers. By and large it has succeeded. In fact, it is primarily 
when Article 9 fails to provide answers in Part 5 and instead, 
simply uses the Article 2 technique of setting forth a "commer-
cial unreasonableness" standard that it generates litigation. 6 
For Rapson, then, a commercial statute that does not discourage liti-
gation is a bad commercial statute, or at least not as good as the statute 
that discourages litigation by "anticipating the issues and furnishing 
answers. "7 
There are several responses to that conclusion. First, it is not clear 
that Article 2 spawns more litigation than Article 9. While there may be 
more sales cases in the U CC digest than there are secured transactions 
cases, this does not establish the proposition that the drafting style of 
Article 2 is the reason for the greater volume of sales litigation. It may 
just be that there are many (hundreds of times) more sales than there are 
secured transactions. Every day virtually every commercial entity in the 
developed world is involved in a sales transaction. The same is not true 
of secured transactions. Before we could conclude that Article 2 gener-
ates more litigation than Article 9, we would have to know what percent-
age of sales and secured transactions results in litigation. 
Further, is it fair to conclude that Part 5 of Article 9 is the most 
litigated portion of the secured transactions article simply because it 
6. Letter from Donald J. Rapson, Member, Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, to 
Peter A. Alces, Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1986) (on file 
with author). 
7. Id. at 2. 
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incorporates Article 2 notions of "commercial unreasonableness"? 
Maybe Part 5 is heavily litigated because of the time at which it becomes 
relevant: The debtor has defaulted in its contract with the secured party 
and the secured party is foreclosing on the collateral. Debtors may be 
more litigious when they have little to lose and everything to gain. 
Even if it were accurate that Article 2 generates more litigation than 
most of Article 9, one could argue that the measure of a commercial 
statute is not the volume of litigation it engenders or discourages, but the 
quality of the results that courts can reach when they correctly apply the 
statute's provisions. That is, wouldn't we prefer commercial law that 
accommodates our getting the right answer when we do litigate over law 
that discourages the very litigation that might guide us toward that an-
swer? Certainly we could draft a statute that precluded litigation and 
denied transactors access to the courts, but that would not be desirable, 
even if efficacious. The answer lies in balance, a balance between rules 
that provide predictable results and those that guide us toward the best 
results. It would be inappropriate to conclude that commercial law that 
emphasizes "the sense of the situation"-essentially factual determina-
tions-is deficient because it is less predictable before the fact. 
Article 2, in its way, anticipates the issues and furnishes the means 
of obtaining the answers. Llewellyn recognized that it could not provide 
the answers. To an extent, the drafters of Article 2A recognized that the 
sales law model could support other commercial contexts and chose to 
draft as the uniform personal property lease law a new Article 2A rather 
than a new Article 9A. Certainly that choice was to an extent colored by 
the desire to avoid imposing a filing requirement in the lease setting. 8 
But the fact that Article 2A ~racks Article 2 so extensively supports the 
conclusion that the Article 2 model is viable and is not rendered less so 
by its imposition of a reasonableness analysis. In fact, the Article 2 pro-
visions not imposed on the lease law were not discarded because of their 
incorporation of reasonableness tests. They were otherwise deficient. 9 In 
the one instance in which the drafters of Article 2A expressed an interest 
in departing from a reasonableness inquiry, the comment explaining their 
8. For the terms of the filing requirement debate, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. 
REv. 175 (1983), and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Owner· 
ship" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 
ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988). 
9. For example, the drafters of Article 2A chose not to include a lease analogue of the 
sales article "battle of the forms" provision, U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990). 
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reasons for doing so establishes that they did not so much discard reason-
ableness as define it in terms of the lease context. 10 
Similarly probative is the expansion of the good faith inquiry in re-
vised Articles 3, 4 and 6, as well as in new Article 4A, to expressly incor-
porate conceptions of reasonableness. If the complaint about Llewellyn's 
Article 2 were that it relies too much on conceptions of reasonableness, it 
would be curious that the sponsoring organizations have not backed off 
of the requirement but rather have multiplied the contexts in which it 
matters. 
I suspect, however, that the cause of the uneasiness with Article 2, 
and Llewellyn's jurisprudential position, is not that it relies too much on 
reasonableness inquiries but that it restates the question rather than pro-
vides certain answers. From the perspective of some sophisticated com-
mercial counsel, the method of Article 2 inhibits lawyering on behalf of 
clients uncomfortable with a judge's or jury's exercising judgment that 
might not vindicate the economic leverage such clients could utilize if 
Article 2 were not the law. It is not, then, the lack of certainty and 
predictability that they find most troubling. 
That conclusion is supported daily by courts that construe the most 
ostensibly certain and formal aspects of the Commercial Code. There is 
probably no more clear example of such a mechanical Code concept than 
the Article 9 filing statement requirements. 11 If, in fact, Article 9 works 
because the drafters anticipated the issues and formulated the best an-
swers, then it is difficult to explain the Article 9 filing system. The filing 
and search system is a morass, 12 and Article 9 debtors, trustees in bank-
ruptcy and junior secured parties have little trouble finding a litigable 
issue that can survive summary judgment in order to frustrate, if not 
altogether defeat, the secured party.13 
The state of Article 9 filing litigation, then, intimates that the solu-
tion to the litigation problem might not rest alone in the terms of the 
statutory formulation. Instead, the volume of litigation that a statute or 
10. See id. § 2A-504. 
11. See id. art. 9. 
12. See generally Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 
9 Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99 (1991) (suggesting need for changes to assure that 
substance prevails over form). 
13. See Letter from James J. White to Charles W. Mooney & Steven L. Harris, Co-
Reporters, Permanent Editorial Board Article 9 Study 1-3 (Sept. 3, 1992) (on file with author) 
(urging that revised Article 9 should make unperfected security interest superior to judicial 
lien-claim asserted by trustee in bankruptcy-in order to avoid financing statement litigation 
in bankruptcy setting). Professor White wrote: "This litigation is waste. It is wonderful for us 
lawyers, but adds little or nothing of social value." I d. at 2. 
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provision generates may be more a function of the transactional contexts 
in which the litigable issues arise. If a particular provision comes into 
play when a party to the transaction is in bankruptcy, then that provision 
might be the source of more litigation than would an even more flexible, 
ostensibly uncertain, formulation that is pertinent at a point in the trans-
action at which the parties are not necessarily any closer to bankruptcy. 
It may also be that there is a greater likelihood of litigation if the 
parties to a transaction are more likely to be represented by counsel and 
the value in dispute is sufficient to justify the litigation expense for both 
transactors. This is not to say that the sophistication and means of the 
litigants bear a relation to the volume of litigation more directly than the 
relationship between flexibility ("reasonableness" tests) and litigation 
volume, but it does suggest that the case against Article 2, based on the 
idea that the Article's focus on fact-sensitive determinations generate liti-
gation, has not been made. 
Because Article 2's preoccupation with factual determinations may 
not, as some would assert, actually cripple the legislation, that still does 
not provide any argument in favor of Llewellyn's style. It would barely 
constitute faint praise. But Llewellyn's style in drafting Article 2 is 
otherwise defensible, even laudable. The argument in its favor may 
proceed from Lon Fuller's description of one perspective toward 
adjudication: 
We are all familiar with the process by which the judicial 
reform of disfavored legislative enactments is accomplished .... 
The process ... requires three steps. The first of these is to 
divine some single "purpose" which the statute serves. This is 
done although not one statute in a hundred has any such single 
purpose, and although the objectives of nearly every statute are 
differently interpreted by the different classes of its sponsors. 
The second step is to discover that a mythical being called "the 
legislator," in pursuit of this imagined "purpose," overlooked 
something or left some gap or imperfection in his work. Then 
comes the final and most refreshing part of the task, which 
is, of course, to fill in the blank thus created. Quod erat 
faciendum. 
My [fellow justice]'s penchant for finding holes in statutes 
reminds one of the story told by an ancient author about the 
man who ate a pair of shoes. Asked how he liked them, he 
replied that the part he liked best was the holes. That is the 
way my [fellow justice] feels about statutes; the more holes they 
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have in them the better he likes them. In short, he doesn't like 
statutes. 14 
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The jurisprudential perspective Fuller describes is Cardozo's per-
spective as described by Llewellyn. 15 But does it make sense to say that 
Llewellyn would build a statute around the jurisprudential perspective of 
a jurist who did not like statutes? Yes. In fact, I wonder whether Llew-
ellyn liked statutes very much. 
Article 2 has been recognized as a common-law code. The sales ar-
ticle represents the tortification of contract law in commercial sales con-
texts. The focus is on factual analyses in terms of fundamental 
principles. Llewellyn concluded that it was better to define the parame-
ters of acceptable commercial behavior and practices and empower 
judges and juries, than to fix ostensibly determinate and certain rules and 
then allow the courts and lawyers to contort the spirit of the law while 
being true to its letter. 
The focus on result in terms of the sense of the situation, something 
more than common sense, would provide more predictable results than 
would the provision of certain statutory terms. The irony is that the 
more flexible the drafting, the more "open-ended" the statutory inquiry, 
the more predictable the results that would flow from the courts' applica-
tion of the statute. The provisions of Article 2 betray a coherent and 
comprehensive method. It is that method that provides all the predict-
ability that can be expected of the law. 
It would be a mistake for the drafters of commercial law to give up 
on Llewellyn's jurisprudential approach, to look for ways to distinguish 
one commercial context from the next-such as software licensing from 
sales and leases of goods and services-to disintegrate the commercial 
law with new Articles 2B, 2C, ad nauseum, rather than to look for ways 
to integrate commercial legislation. The challenge for the drafters of a 
revised Article 2 is to identify the strategic strong points Llewellyn knew 
would reveal themselves to the careful lawyer-scholar. Article 2 should 
certainly be revised, if for no other reason than to bring more commercial 
contracts within its scope. 
But maybe we will find looking back on 1993, in twenty-five or so 
years, that in their desire to follow in the footsteps of the drafters of the 
original Uniform Commercial Code, the commercial lawyer-scholars of 
the late twentieth century divided the Code into more and more special-
14. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 616, 634 
(1949). 
15. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
430-37 (1960). 
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ized and discrete articles, each bearing the imprint of the particular pre-
disposition of its drafter(s). Then, in around the year 2020, the task will 
be to discern and recapture the common ground, to emphasize funda-
mental affinities rather than superficial bases for distinction. Maybe only 
then we will see the beginning of the "neo-realist" movement. 
